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Brown and the Myth of the Equality/Efficiency
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Steven A. Ramirez*
Economists have long recognized that some, even many, policy
issues involve a trade-off between two fundamental values: economic
efficiency and equality.' Some commentators are so taken with this
so-called trade-off that they have difficulty even imagining policy ini-
tiatives that further both values.2 Nevertheless, there are many laws
and policies that serve both to enhance economic efficiency and to
create a more egalitarian society. 3 Indeed, there is a growing body of
economic science that looks beyond mere market theory to clarify the
endogenous factors associated with growth;4 economists pursuing en-
dogenous growth theory have increasingly shown that inequality
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1. Kermit Gordon, Foreword to ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENcY: THE BIG
TRADEOFF at vii-x (1975). "At many points ... society confronts choices that offer somewhat
more equality at the expense of efficiency or somewhat more efficiency at the expense of equal-
ity. In the idiom of the economist, a [trade-off] emerges between equality and efficiency." Id. at
vii. Of course, there are few absolutes in economics. Indeed, "Okun argues that both efficiency
and economic equality can be increased by attacking some inequalities of opportunity, such as
racial and sexual discrimination in jobs and barriers to access to capital." Id. at ix.
2. See Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513,
513 (1987) ("Social welfare legislation, notably including legislation designed to help minority
groups, is usually thought to involve a trade-off between equity and efficiency, or between the
just distribution of society's wealth and the aggregate amount of that wealth."). Posner specifi-
cally argued that Title VII was not efficient because of the costs implicit in forcing whites to
associate with people against their will. Id. at 515. Posner, however, fails to even discuss the fact
that the decreased utility of forced association results in enhanced wealth through market trans-
actions that may have otherwise not occurred. See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1431 (1986) ("Title VII can be understood to represent wealth-maxi-
mizing legislation rather than as some tyrannical or misguided attempt to disregard private
preferences.").
3. OKUN, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that anything that improves "productivity and earnings
potential of unskilled workers might benefit society with greater efficiency and greater
equality.").
4. Neri Salvadori, Introduction to OLD kA.1 NEw GROWTH THEORIES: AN AssESSMETrr xi
(N. Salvadori, ed. 2003) ("The recent new growth theory (NGT) is also called 'endogenous
growth theory,' since according to it the growth rate is determined from within the model and is
not given as an exogenous factor."). See also ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMiCS 330
(2003) ("In the late 1980s there was an explosion of activity in what is now called 'endogenous
growth theory,' so named because it attempts to explain technical change as the outcome of
market ... incentives rather than just assuming that technical change drops exogenously from
the sky."). Endogenous growth theory is just beginning to be impounded into the economic
analysis of law. See Steven A. Ramirez, What We Teach When We Teach About Race: The Prob-
lem of Law and Pseudo-Economics, 54 J. LEO. EDuc. 365, 375 n. 49 (2004) [hereinafter Ramirez
I] (arguing that racial inequality adds to the macroeconomic costs of race in America because
inequality harms growth); Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at
70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 564 n. 380 (2003) [hereinafter Ramirez II] (arguing that elements of the
New Deal demonstrated how incentives can be created to spur macroeconomic growth).
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threatens growth and stability.5 Perhaps no inequality is more diffi-
cult to justify economically than racial inequality, for race is a social
construct with no biological or genetic content. 6 Racial inequality ca-
priciously destroys the ability of individuals to economically self-actu-
alize themselves and systematically strips society of the ability to
exploit its human capital to the maximum extent possible.7 The very
concept of race amounts to the wanton and pervasive destruction of
human capital.8 If Brown v. Board of Education9 means anything, it
means that American society finally began to realize the self-destruc-
tion that accompanied racial apartheid and commenced the long and
painful process of deracialization. Brown thus triggered an era
marked by the most dramatic unleashing of human potential in Amer-
ican history. 10
Professor Mildred Robinson's essay certainly demonstrates this
point.1 She stated that as an African-American law professor at the
University of Virginia, Brown had an "exquisite" effect on her life
chances and the opportunities available to her.' 2 Moreover, as Profes-
sor Robinson's forthcoming book demonstrates, she is hardly alone.'
3
5. See, e.g., Anthony Shorrocks & Rolph van der Hoeven, Introduction to GROWTH, INE-
QUALIY, AND POVERTY: PROSPECTS FOR PRO-POOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 2 (A. Shot-
rocks & R. van der Hoeven, eds. 2004) (stating that during the 1990s "[a]n expanding volume of
empirical evidence showed no consistent relationship between growth [and] inequality .... Fur-
thermore, a consensus emerged that the 'high performing' Asian countries.., combined rapid
growth of per capita income with relatively low and stable inequality."); Phillipe Aghion et al.,
Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LIT.
1615, 1615 (1999) ("[T]he view that inequality is growth enhancing has been further challenged
by a number of empirical studies, often based on cross-country regressions of GDP growth on
income inequality. They all find a negative correlation between the average rate of growth and a
number of measures of inequality.").
6. Ramirez I, supra note 4, at 365 (showing that "[t]he pseudo-science of race appears
recently to have suffered some fatal blows").
7. See id. at 374-75 (arguing that the cost of the construct of race in America approaches
$1 trillion per annum).
8. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH 267-78 (2002) (showing that
ethnic conflict leads to economically disruptive political divisions, including diminished invest-
ment in the human capital of ethnically oppressed persons).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. It is significant that Brown dealt with issues of educational opportunity. Endogenous
growth theory identifies human capital formation as a crucial element to economic growth, as
well as a means of achieving greater equality. See also Erich Gundlach et al., Education is Good
for the Poor: A Note on Dollar and Kraay in Shorrocks, supra note 5, at 101 ("[Tlaken together,
our findings suggest that in addition to its growth effect, improving the stock of human capital
may have a substantial [positive] distributional effect on the average income of the poor.").
Professor Easterly suggests that ethnic divisions and oppression can lead to serious loss of out-
put. EASTERLY, supra note 8, at 272. He also suggests that the decline of Jim Crow turned the
South from the most economically backward region to a region that has grown sufficiently to
reach near parity with the rest of the nation. Id. at 276-77.
11. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Fulfilling Brown's Legacy: Bearing the Costs of Realizing
Equality, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2004).
12. Id. at 1 ("Quite simply, were it not for [Brown] and the events set in motion thereby I
would almost certainly not have had the personal and professional experiences that I have, in
fact, enjoyed.").
13. Id. at 2 (citing MILDRED W. ROBINSON & RICHARD BONNIE, VOICES OF THE Brown
Generation: Memories and Reflections of Law Professors (forthcoming) (manuscript on file
with Professor Robinson)).
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Many American law professors are people of color, a fact that simply
was not possible before Brown.14 The wealth generated by these law
professors of color would have been no more possible than the eco-
nomic wealth generating machine that is Michael Jordan or Bill Cosby
or innumerable other political leaders, artists, writers, CEOs, athletes
or entertainers of color. 15 American apartheid simply did not permit
people of color to excel, economically or otherwise. How many con-
tributions were extinguished by the legal imposition of American
apartheid before Brown? How many contributions are being extin-
guished today by the very well-documented continuation of racial ine-
quality in America? This paper cannot answer these questions.
Instead, this paper merely seeks to show that reducing racial inequal-
ity in America today is consistent with efficiency and macroeconomic
performance; in other words, any purported trade-off between eco-
nomics and equality is largely illusory and mythological in the context
of race in America in 2004, just as it is in many other contexts. Cer-
tainly this is the case with regard to Professor Robinson's call for a
free, adequate, and effective education accessible to every American
child. 16
Part I of this article will demonstrate the assumptions and suppo-
sitions supporting the view that enhanced equality imposes economic
costs in terms of either efficiency losses or losses in output. These
assumptions will be challenged with specific counter-assumptions in
an effort to illustrate the weakness of their foundation. Part II of this
paper will demonstrate that inequality in general, and racial inequality
in particular, is harmful to macroeconomic growth and stability. It
will also attempt to assess the vast endogenous growth theory litera-
ture demonstrating this, with a view towards unlocking specific princi-
ples for attacking inequality in ways that can achieve higher growth.
Part III will suggest specific policy proposals for taking steps to reduce
inequality in the United States, through massive investment in human
capital formation, along the lines of the GI Bill and the Civilian Con-
servation Corps. This program can provide a framework for success-
ful public investment that will not cost over the long term, but will
instead pay for itself many times over. This is demonstrated generally
through endogenous growth theory and specifically by the experience
of the United States from the New Deal programs.
In the end, this article fully supports Professor Robinson's call for
devoting more resources to securing Brown's promise of equal educa-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Robinson, supra note 11, at 6 ("Yet, as has been noted in numerous prior Brown anni-
versary observances, the task of affording every child access to an adequate, effective education
in the nation's public schools remains incomplete.").
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tional opportunity. 17 Such an investment, if properly structured,
would spur growth, stability, and output for decades. In other words,
reducing racial inequality through vindication of the underlying values
of Brown would benefit the economy.
I. INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Economists have long maintained that there is a tension between
equality and efficiency insofar as re-distributive taxation policies or
social welfare programs are concerned. 8 Others seemingly go a step
further, suggesting that there is a fundamental trade-off between pro-
ductive efficiency (and/or growth) and social justice.19 "If income is
perfectly equal and everyone is guaranteed the same income level,
then what is the incentive to work? Too much equality may reduce
work effort (and investment) and thereby the total product of soci-
ety. ' 20 Other commentators suggest that the neoclassical paradigm
means that "[o]nce Pareto efficiency is attained, if the resulting society
wants more equity it can have more; but equity must then be pur-
chased by a reduction in efficiency.121 This part of this article seeks to
highlight the theoretical dynamics underpinning any trade-off be-
17. Robinson, supra note 11, at 29 ("Every child must have the right to an adequate educa-
tion, complete in all respects. That right must be vindicated.").
18. "Income redistribution is not a socially costless endeavor because the policies required
to accomplish it generally produce misallocations of resources. This basic proposition is well
known and usually interpreted as implying a trade-off between equality and efficiency." Edgar
K. Browning & William R. Johnson,'The Trade-Off Between Equality and Efficiency, 92 J. PoLrr.
EcoN. 175, 175 (1984). Indeed, Arthur Okun cites to the work of Herbert Spencer, dating from
1884, for the proposition that all universally distributed public goods and services create market
distortions by offering benefits without requiring any production in return. OKUN, supra note 1,
at 8 (citing HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 33 (1884)). Thus, according to
Spencer, public libraries provided real income to citizens and enhanced the value of leisure,
thereby creating disincentives for work. Id. (citing HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE
STATE 33 (1884)). Okun notes that Spencer's argument is flawed because it fails to account for
the efficiency-enhancing role of libraries in fostering the accumulation of human capital. Id.
19. See Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1620.
20. EDWARD NATHAN WOLFF, ECONOMiCS OF POVERTY INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINA-
TION 613 (1997). The only counterargument Professor Wolff articulates with any degree of effec-
tiveness is that the distribution of income may conflict with social goals in terms of fairness. Id.
at 612. An additional counterargument that Wolff raises is theoretically interesting but ulti-
mately empirically indeterminate. Wolff suggests that because of the law of diminishing margi-
nal returns, it is very likely that from a utilitarian/Pareto efficiency perspective, the redistribution
of wealth from rich to poor is likely to maximize utility across society. Id. at 612-13. Judge
Posner responds to this argument by pointing out that income may already be distributed in
accordance with the value that individuals place on money relative to other values such as lei-
sure. It is not clear that there is a means of resolving this debate. Compare WOLFF, supra at
612-13 ("Thus, total utility will reach its highest value when everyone receives the same in-
come.") with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF LAW 472 (6th ed. 2003) (comparing
reasons for income inequality and concluding that if the income differences reflect only differ-
ences in taste, as opposed to differences in talent or luck, "then the rich must have higher margi-
nal utilities of income than the poor; otherwise they would demand the same leisure, and their
incomes would fall").
21. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV.
4, 69 (1994). Professor Hovenkamp argues that the supposed trade-off between equity and effi-
ciency is typically overstated, and, in any event, fails to address the fundamental issue of how law
can serve to maximize welfare across society. Id. at 10-11.
HeinOnline  -- 44 Washburn L.J. 90 2004-2005
2004] Brown and the Myth of the Equality/Efficiency Trade-Off 91
tween equality and either allocative efficiency and macroeconomic
output, which is occasionally termed productive efficiency. 22
One premise underlying this trade-off is that such policies neces-
sarily serve to diminish market incentives for individual innovation
and wealth generation by imposing higher marginal taxation rates
than would otherwise be necessary or by otherwise decoupling re-
wards from output.23 As one prominent economist has stated "[T]he
economic institutions of the United States rest on voluntary exchange
and on private ownership of productive assets; and they involve
money rewards and penalties that generate an unequal distribution of
income and wealth." 24 So cast, this argument smacks of an efficiency-
based rationale insofar as incentives are viewed as a mandatory foun-
dation for facilitating and maximizing market operation as a means of
allocating goods. Professor Wolff, however, casts this same argument
with a more macroeconomic flavor: "[t]he total product of the econ-
omy will be greater if workers are rewarded according to what they
produce rather than being guaranteed an income that is not directly
related to their productivity. '25 Inequality is seen under this thesis as
having both market efficiency and output maximization bases; and
lowering inequality would serve to compromise these important eco-
nomic values. Of course, if inequality reflects a social, political, cul-
tural, and economic reality that entrenches privilege and strips
individuals of real economic opportunity, then inequality acts to stunt
incentives instead of reflecting an optimized system of incentives and
rewards. 26
A second theoretical basis for supposing that inequality can en-
hance growth is the higher propensity to save that is associated with
22. See JEFFERY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42 (2002) (defining productive effi-
ciency as attaining an outcome, presumably macroeconomic output, "at the lowest possible
cost"). Typically, macroeconomists, including those studying the endogenous factors driving
macroeconomic growth, do not use the term "productive efficiency," preferring instead to use
output or GDP. See generally, ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS (9th ed., 2003) (using
the terms output and GDP). Professor Harrison distinguishes "allocative efficiency" from "pro-
ductive efficiency" by focusing on the "willingness and ability to pay" of consumers to pay for
goods. HARRISON, supra, at 42-43. Thus, a given nation may have a Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks
efficient allocation of goods without achieving the highest potential macroeconomic output. See
Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of12 U.S.C. Section 1821(k): Congressional Subsidizing of Negli-
gent Bank Directors and Officers?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 625, 683-85 (1996). Indeed, this paper
supports that position by demonstrating that the distribution of resources may stunt growth,
regardless of how efficiently such goods are allocated in accordance with pre-existing ability and
willingness to pay.
23. Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1615 ("[T]he conventional textbook approach is that
inequality is good for incentives and therefore good for growth, even though incentive and
growth considerations might (sometimes) be traded off against equity or insurance goals.").
24. OKUN, supra note 1, at 32.
25. WOLFF, supra note 20, at 615.
26. I have previously demonstrated that African-Americans in present day America suffer
from "pervasive social oppression" as manifest in a range of social indicators of well-being from
IQ scores to infant mortality to work environments pervaded by racial hostility. Steven A. Ra-
mirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MiCH. J. RACE & L. 127, 139-40, 150-52
(2000).
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higher levels of wealth.2 7 Thus, "[i]f the growth rate of GDP is di-
rectly related to the proportion of national income that is saved, more
unequal economies are bound to grow faster than economies charac-
terized by more equitable distribution of income. '2 8 This has been
termed the "Kaldorian view" of how inequality can spur growth, be-
cause it was originally articulated by economist Nicolas Kaldor.29
However, Kaldor did not assess the possibility that inequality may cre-
ate political pressure for redistribution through distortionary taxes.30
Finally, Kaldor did not address the possibility that inequality could
have negative implications on a nation's political stability which could
create an environment adverse to investment.31
A third basis for theorizing that inequality enhances output is the
prospect of investment indivisibilities. This idea is somewhat related
to the marginal-propensity-to-save thesis, but is explicitly premised on
dysfunctional financial markets. "In the absence of a broad and well-
functioning market for shares, wealth obviously needs to be suffi-
ciently concentrated in order for an individual .. to be able to cover
... large sunk costs and thereby initiate.., new industrial activity. '32
This thesis fails to support any given level of inequality in developed
nations with efficient capital markets like the United States.
Thus, it was once "textbook" economics that inequality was nec-
essary to create incentives for growth.33 Indeed, even very recent eco-
nomics textbooks adhere to this construct. For example, The
Economics of Poverty, Inequality and Discrimination, published in
1997, illustrates the very speculative basis for the whole idea that ine-
quality enhances the "total product" of an economy.34 The analysis is
supported by no empirical data.35 There is no recognition that every
argument in favor of inequality as a prop to growth has a counter
speculative argument, nor that empirical data are needed to resolve
the dueling theoretical speculations.3 6
27. WOLFF, supra note 20, at 616 n. 2.
28. Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1620.
29. See Nicholas Kaldor, Alternative Theories of Distribution, 23 REV. ECON. S'ruD. 83, 94-
100 (1956) (articulating a Keynesian theoretical framework regarding the economic implications
of differing propensities to save between labor and capitalists and assuming that capitalists will
save more than laborers).
30. See Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, 109 0.
J. ECON. 465 (1994). Alesina & Rodrik posit, but do not test, the theory that inequality leads to
political demands for distortionary taxation policies. See id. at 468-84.
31. Indeed, Alesina and Perotti find that after controlling for political instability, increased
investment from any Kaldor effect appears to be cancelled out by demand for distortionary
redistribution policies, or simply does not exist in the first instance. See Alberto Alesina &
Roberto Perotti, Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment, 40 EUR. ECON. REV.
1203, 1205 (1996).
32. Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1620.
33. Id. at 1615.
34. See WOLFF, supra note 20, at 615.
35. See id. at 611-17.
36. See id.
[Vol. 44
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Judge Posner illustrates this habit of indulging only theoretical
speculations consistent with the finding that inequality is not economi-
cally pernicious. Posner recognizes that a more egalitarian distribu-
tion of income is consistent with a lower crime rate because gainful
employment would increase the opportunity costs of crimes like theft.
Thus, redistribution away from the wealthy would diminish the bene-
fits of such crimes.37 That conclusion seems sound. Posner then
speculates, however, that redistributing wealth could increase crime
because the costs of protecting property are lower if property holdings
are concentrated, and it would be easier to fence luxury goods in a
society with a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. 38 Posner fails to
cite any empirical data in support of these speculations and fails to
even address whether the reduction in crime from employment out-
weighs the impact of these latter factors. Simply stated, the Posner
analysis on this point is deeply flawed and ultimately amounts to bare
speculation. It is difficult to see the point of this kind of economic
"analysis" if it serves only as a tool for reaching or reinforcing conclu-
sions that are consistent with the writer's comfort zone, ideology or
self-interest. 39
Instead, what is needed is an economic analysis that actually can
provide reliable insight into difficult policy issues of law. The next
section will seek to demonstrate that unlike the weak theoretical bases
supporting the equality/efficiency trade-off, endogenous growth the-
ory provides empirical support for economic propositions that can
serve as a policy basis for legal and regulatory structures in the specific
context of reducing racial inequality to enhance economic growth.
II. INEQUALITY AND MACROECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY
Economists now recognize that whatever the microeconomic effi-
ciency of inequality, it impairs macroeconomic performance, leading
37. POSNER, supra note 20, at 219.
38. Id. at 219-20.
39. A related theory of the relationship between economic performance and inequality is
the Kuznets Hypothesis. In 1963, economist Simon Kuznets found an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between income inequality and per capita GNP. Aghion, supra note 5, at 1616 (citing
Simon Kuznets, Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, 11 ECON. DEV. &
CULT. CHANGE 1 (1963)). This has been widely interpreted to mean that inequality is needed to
spur growth at the beginning of economic development and industrialization, but that the growth
that comes with development then operates to diminish inequality. Id. Through the 1970s, the
relationship seemed to hold, particularly with respect to developed nations like the United
States. Id. Recently, inequality has risen significantly in a number of developed nations, includ-
ing the United States. Id. The decline of the Kuznets Hypothesis tracks the decline of the so-
called efficiency/equity trade-off, and it too suffered from a weak empirical basis accompanied
by excessively sanguine theoretical assumptions. It also supports the suggestion that new theo-
ries are needed to understand the relationship between economic growth and inequality. Id, at
1617.
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to reduced growth.40 As of 2004, it was clear that among economists
engaged in the study of growth, there was a "growing consensus that
countries with relatively egalitarian distribution of assets and incomes
tend to grow faster. ' 41 This consensus emerged coincident with the
development of endogenous growth theory in the 1990s; several stud-
ies of national economic growth from large cross-sections of countries
have examined the impact of inequality. 42 "The picture they draw is
impressively unambiguous, since they all suggest that greater inequal-
ity reduces the rate of growth. '43 These cross-country regressions of
GDP growth on inequality seemingly reach the same conclusion re-
gardless of the precise measure of inequality utilized or whether de-
veloped or less-developed economies are studied.
44
Thus, the proposition that inequality hinders growth has been
tested empirically in a variety of differing contexts. In 1994, Alberto
Alesina and Dani Rodrik regressed the average growth rate for differ-
ing sets of countries from 1960 to 1985 on the Gini coefficient 45 (a
40.
The development of endogenous growth theory and the availability of comparable data
on national incomes and growth rates for a large cross-section of countries has permit
ted the empirical analysis of the causes of national differences in growth rates. Within
this vast literature, several studies have examined the impact of inequality upon eco-
nomic growth. The picture they draw is impressively unambiguous, since they all sug-
gest that greater inequality reduces the rate of growth.
Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1617 (citing Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Distributive
Politics and Economic Growth, 40 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 1203, 1225 (1996) ("[Ilncome ine-
quality increases social discontent and fuels social unrest. The latter.., has a negative effect on
investment and, as a consequence, reduces growth.")); see also Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income
Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149 (1996); Torsten Per-
sson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful to Growth?, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 600, 617
(1994) (stating that: "[Our] main theoretical result is that income inequality is harmful for
growth, because it leads to policies that do not protect property rights and do not allow full
private appropriation of returns from investment" and that "[t]his implication is strongly sup-
ported by the historical evidence of a narrow [cross-section of countries and by the postwar
evidence from a broad [cross-section] of countries"); Roberto Perotti, Political Equilibrium, In-
come Distribution and Growth, 60 REv. ECON. STuDIEs, 755, 757 (1993) (stating that a very
unequal society will fail to invest in human capital formation sufficiently to sustain enhanced
growth and that a more egalitarian society will invest in education sufficiently to reduce inequal-
ity and spur growth).
41. Shorrocks & van der Hoeven, Introduction to Shorrocks, supra note 5, at 7.
To sum up, polarization because of inequality is a recipe for continuing underdevelop-
ment. Either populist governments will seek to redistribute income to their supporters,
or the elites will suppress democracy and mass education .... The data confirm that
countries that are more unequal are also more politically unstable; they have more
revolutions and coups. Societies with a large middle class, on the other hand, have
incentives favorably aligned for growth, political stability, and democracy.
EASTERLY, supra note 8, at 267.
42. Aghion et'al., supra note 5, at 1617.
43. Id.
44. Philippe Aghion, Inequality and Economic Growth, in GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND
GLOBALIZATION 7 (Philippe Aghion & Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., 1998) (citing, e.g.; R. Haus-
mann and M. Gavin, Securing Stability and Growth in a Shock-Prone Region: The Policy Chal-
lenges for Latin America, in SECURING STABILITY AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA (Hausmann
& Reisen, eds., 1996)).
45. The Gini coefficient:
measures the inequality ... within a country. It varies from zero, which indicates per-
fect equality, with every household earning exactly the same, to one, which implies
absolute inequality, with a single household earning a country's entire income. Latin
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measure of inequality) of income and of land. Both variables had a
negative impact on growth, even after controlling for per capita in-
come and primary school enrollment in 1960.46 Torsten Persson and
Guido Tabelli regressed the GDP growth on income inequality in a
narrow cross-section of nine developed countries from 1830 to 1985
and a broad cross-section of fifty-six less-developed nations from 1960
to 1985. For the broader cross-section, they found that a greater share
of income in the middle quintile of income distribution was robustly
and significantly associated with higher growth.47 From the more nar-
row cross-section they found that countries with more income concen-
trated in the top quintile suffered retarded growth.48 "We can
summarize our tentative conclusion in a simple aphorism: inequality is
harmful for growth. ' 49 Roberto Perotti regressed growth on a wide
variety of factors including inequality in a large cross-section of devel-
oped economies over a period of several decades; he also found a pos-
itive association between equality and growth. 50
Aside from cross-country regressions of output and inequality,
there is further evidence that any trade-off between equality and effi-
ciency (or output) is mythological. Case studies from specific coun-
tries also support the central finding that inequality harms growth.
For example, Alesina and Perotti support their analysis regarding the
macro-economically pernicious effect of inequality with a comparison
of successful Asian economies and less successful Latin American na-
tions.51 They suggest that their empirical analysis is consistent with
events in those two regions, even though the data were not sufficient
to include these nations in their study.52 East Asian economies, like
the "four dragons" of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Tai-
wan, benefited from land reform after World War II, and thereafter
enjoyed political stability and strong growth; Latin American nations
were marked by durable inequality and slow growth.53 Similarly,
America is the world's most unequal region with a Gini coefficient of around 0.5; in
rich countries the figure is closer to 0.3.
Economics A-Z, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD. (2004) available at http://www.economist.
com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LEITER=G#GINI%20COEFFICIENT (last visited
Oct. 17, 2004).
46. Alesina & Rodrik, supra note 30, at 481. The Alesina & Rodrik empirical study uses
two samples: first, a high data quality sample of forty-six nations that included all developed
economies; and second, a larger sample of seventy nations that included many less developed
countries. Id. at 479-82 and 486-87. Alesina & Rodrik also tested the impact of a democratic
versus a nondemocratic government and negated any influence of this factor over the relation-
ship between inequality and growth. Id. at 481.
47. Persson & Tabellini, supra note 40, at 610-15.
48. Id. at 605-10.
49. Id. at 600.
50. Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Policy, Income Distribution, and Growth, 1 J. EcoN. GROWTH
149 (1996).
51. Alesina & Perotti, supra note 40, at 1226.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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South Korea and the Philippines have served to provide an interesting
case study demonstrating the relationship between growth and ine-
quality.54 In the early 1960s, these two nations had strikingly similar
macroeconomic profiles.5 5 Their GDP per capita, investment rates,
and savings rates were comparable. 56 With respect to inequality, how-
ever, the Philippines had twice the level of income inequality as South
Korea.57 Over the next thirty years, South Korea's output quintupled,
while the Philippines merely doubled.58 Such dramatic differences in
macroeconomic performance defy any microeconomic suppositions or
theoretical speculations that there is some kind of trade-off between
the pursuit of equality and the pursuit of growth.59 All of this evi-
dence is consistent: the supposed trade-off between equality and eco-
nomic performance is illusory at best; indeed, the great weight of
evidence strongly suggests that inequality harms growth.60
Moreover, there is good reason to think that the elimination of
racial inequality carries a particularly powerful potential for enhanced
growth. Race is a social construct. There is no biological nor genetic
significance to anything that approaches traditional racial categories. 61
Therefore, all socially significant disparities must also be artificial so-
cial constructs. Indeed, in light of evidence from the new genetics, the
burden of proof is clearly on our society in general to attempt to jus-
tify the deep social chasms that plague our society based only upon
the thin veneer of race. In other words, inequality in general in the
United States can plausibly be attributed, in part, to a rational system
of market rewards and penalties; for African-Americans and other
54. Roland Benabou, Inequality & Growth, in NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 11-74
(1996).
55. Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1615-16.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1616.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1616 (stating with respect to the comparison of South Korea and the Philippines
that "contrary to what the standard argument predicts, the more unequal country grew more
slowly").
60. See Saurav Dev Bhatta, Are Inequality and Poverty Harmful for Economic Growth: Evi-
dence from the Metropolitan Areas of the United States, 23 J. URBAN AFFAIRS 335, 335-36
(2001) (stating that the "dominant view is that inequality is harmful for growth" but that there is
evidence that inequality and growth are positively related for high GDP nations) (citing, e.g.,
ROBERT J. BARRO, INEQUALITY, GROWTH AND INVESTMENT, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7038, 1999). The alternative view suggests that the real culprit driving sup-
pressed growth is not inequality, but rather poverty. Bhatta's empirical study supports the view
that poverty, not inequality, suppresses growth. Nevertheless, Bhatta's study of the influence of
inequality and poverty on growth in the major metropolitan areas of the United States fully
supports the main thesis of this article: "there is definitely no tradeoff between poverty reduction
and economic growth." Id. at 357. The issue of whether poverty reduction or inequality is the
culprit is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper is essentially a search for policies that both
reduce poverty/inequality and enhance growth. Bhatta concludes that "there may exist a virtu-
ous cycle of poverty reduction and economic growth-higher economic growth helps to reduce
poverty, and a lower poverty rate is beneficial for economic growth." Id. Unfortunately, due to
Bhatta's limited focus on metropolitan areas, he is unable to pinpoint any particular set of poli-
cies to explain how to achieve that virtuous cycle.
61. Ramire2 I, supra note 4, at 365-66.
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people of color it is clearly a function of pervasive social oppression at
work as manifest in measures of social well-being ranging from stan-
dardized test scores to infant mortality to life expectancy. 62 As such,
there is a high degree of likelihood that reduction of racial inequality
in America would deliver superior and durable boosts to
macroeconomic performance. It is simply a reflection of the depth
and durability of the racial disparities that are present today in the
United States.
Some economists suggest that nations afflicted with racial strife
suffer retarded macroeconomic growth by 2% per annum.63 This oc-
curs because ethnic and cultural strife and tensions create both distor-
tions in public investments and harmful fiscal and monetary policies.
64
Ethnic diversity may be harmful to growth because politicians exploit
ethnic jealousies and hatreds.65 William Easterly has demonstrated
that while economic inequality harms macroeconomic performance,
and racial tension similarly harms macroeconomic performance, the
two together create a powerful drag on output.66 In the United States,
racial oppression inflicts costs approaching $1 trillion per annum.67
These costs may be understated relative to a society that embraces
diversity and uses it as a strategic strength to enhance critical thinking
skills and broaden cultural perspectives. 68 Empirical data suggest that
harnessing these cognitive skills could enhance the productivity of a
nation.69 Consequently, a nation with cultural or ethnic diversity faces
a choice: it may enact policies and a legal structure to facilitate un-
leashing the benefits of cultural diversity, 70 or it may do nothing and
62. Id. at 374-75.
63. EASTERLY, supra note 8, at 273 (table 13.2).
64. Id. at 270-73.
65. Id. at 270.
66. Id. at 280 (figure 13.1).
67. See supra note 7.
68. See, e.g., Poppy Lauretta McLeod, Sharon Alisa Lobel & Taylor Cox, Jr., Ethnic Diver-
sity and Creativity in Small Groups, 27 SMALL GROUP RES. 248, 252 (1996) (finding that ethni-
cally diverse workgroups produced higher quality ideas than homogenous groups).
69. See e.g., David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 36 (2003) ("[Dliversity produces more effective problem solving. While
heterogeneity may initially produce more conflict ... the variety of perspectives that emerges
cause decision makers to evaluate more alternatives and more carefully explore the conse-
quences of these alternatives."). This study specifically found "a positive significant relationship
between board diversity and firm value." Id. Absent studies of the macroeconomic impact of a
society-wide embrace of diversity, such studies serve to provide the best inferential support that
embracing diversity will support macroeconomic performance. Professor Easterly suggests that
the repeal of "Jim Crow" laws in the South, and the end of apartheid generally in the United
States, has mitigated the economic effects of race in America. EASTERLY, supra note 8, at 276-
77.
70. A sample of such policies in the specific context of the American legal system would
include encouraging businesses to implement diversity policies, requiring businesses to disclose
risks of diversity, and adjusting the United States Supreme Court's approach to diversity issues
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Di-
versity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 33, 67-77 (2001) [hereinafter Ranirez III]; Steven A. Ramirez,
Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 109-32 (2000).
HeinOnline  -- 44 Washburn L.J. 97 2004-2005
Washburn Law Journal [Vol.44
allow cultural diversity to slowly erode its economic performance and
social fabric.71 If not managed appropriately, ethnic and cultural divi-
sions will sap an economy's strength; in combination with economic
inequality it will seriously impede macroeconomic performance. 72
This is significant in terms of the policy dynamics across a range
of issues from tax policy to employment discrimination law.73 Yet, in
general terms showing that the alleged equality/efficiency trade-off is
largely mythological is a beginning not an end.74 For example, is there
some threshold level at which inequality may benefit macroeconomic
growth, notwithstanding the fact that the empirical record suggests
that most of the world is not at that threshold? In general terms, the
economic performance of communism suggests that societies in the
past have pursued an equal distribution of resources in ways that di-
minished incentives to produce.75 Certainly, it is fair to say that the
empirical data thus far does not simply support blind pursuit of equal-
ity, everywhere and always. 76 No economist has suggested that per-
fect equality maximizes macroeconomic performance.77 Moreover,
mere recognition that inequality seems to have burdened most of the
world's capitalist economies in no way illuminates the best methods of
diminishing inequality in a way that will unleash a virtuous cycle of
economic growth.78 Endogenous growth theory teaches that many le-
gal, regulatory, and policy initiatives support superior growth and
macroeconomic performance. 79 Some of these initiatives may dimin-
71. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
72. "Inequality in labor income has increased sharply in the [United States] since the early
1970s." Jonathon Heathcote. Kjetil Storesletten & Giovanni L. Violante, The Cross-Sectional
Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States at 29 (January 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). "[Wie find that the unconditional expected welfare losses asso-
ciated with widening wage inequality can be large. For example, they are equivalent to a five
percent decline in lifetime income for cohorts entering the labor market in the mid 1980s." Id. at
30. The authors of this particular study state that one way to extend their research would be to
focus upon inequality among non-white workers. Id. The data suggest, however, that despite a
brief respite in the mid-1960s, the costs of racial inequality has also risen since the 1970s. Rami-
rez 1, supra note 4, at 373.
73. See generally William Easterly & Sergio Rebelo, Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth:
An Empirical Investigation, 32 J. MONETARY ECON. 417 (1993) (finding that redistribution
through taxation and social spending raised growth rates); Perotti, supra note 40, at 150-51 (find-
ing that high marginal tax rates are associated with a significant positive impact on growth).
74. See supra notes 5, 40, 41, and 44 and accompanying text.
75. EASTERLY, supra note 8, at 33-34 (recounting economic problems associated with com-
munism and stating that as of 2001 the Soviet Union had one-sixth the per capita GDP of the
United States).
76. Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, & Andrei Shlcifer, The Injustice of Inequality, at 29
(July 29, 2002) (working paper, on file with author) (noting that massive redistribution of wealth
is typically associated with "dramatically slowed economic and social progress").
77. Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia Penalosa specifically attempt to create a theoretical frame-
work that explains why "in some instances, greater inequality may reduce an economy's rate of
growth." Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1616.
78. See supra notes 74-77.
79. See Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1618 (stating that standard regressions in the endoge-
nous growth theory include per capita GDP, educational levels, and the investment deflator).
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ish and others may exacerbate inequality.80 The mere recognition that
inequality can retard growth does not in itself demonstrate any opti-
mal means of pursuing equality or growth without understanding the
underlying dynamics of an economy and the relationship of inequality
to growth.8t
Macroeconomists have worked to shed more light on the rela-
tionship between inequality and output by investigating a number of
channels by which inequality may harm macroeconomic perform-
ance.8 2 One approach stresses the role inequality may play in exacer-
bating macroeconomic instability and volatility.8 3 Others suggest that
political instability associated with social unrest leads to riots and
other disruptions to commercial stability and expectations.8 4 Another
approach focuses on the ability of the rich to use political influence to
subvert property rights and impair growth.8 5 A final channel through
which inequality harms macroeconomic performance is through credit
rationing. Specifically, financial markets will often divert credit from
those with the most productive uses to those with the most wealth
available to secure repayment. Thus, greater credit availability is as-
sociated with higher growth. 6 The underlying theory to all of those
approaches is that wealth inequality undermines investment in human
or physical capital, impairing long-term growth.8 7 In a globalized
economy, where unskilled labor must be prepared to compete with
Indian, Chinese, and Mexican laborers, human capital in particular
seems pivotal to macroeconomic growth.8
8
Therefore, it makes intuitive sense that enhancing the ability of
the impoverished to accumulate capital, and human capital in particu-
lar, can serve to mitigate inequality while simultaneously enhancing
80. Humberto Lopez, Macroeconomics and Inequality, at 1 (Oct. 23-24, 2003) (IMF work-
ing paper, on file with author) (finding that some "pro-growth policies" diminish inequality and
others exacerbate inequality).
81. The theoretical framework for explaining why inequality harms includes the following
four factors: 1) disaving or unproductive investment by the rich; 2) deficient human capital for-
mation among the poor; 3) suppressed demand as the poor seek basic goods locally produced;
and 4) political rejection among the masses. MICHAEL TODARo, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 165-
66 (1997).
82. Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1618.
83. See id.
84. See generally R. Hausmann & M. Gavin, Securing Stability and Growth in a Shock
Prone Region: The Policy Challenges for Latin America, in SECURING STABILITY AND GROWTH
IN LATIN AMERICA (R. Hausmann & H. Reisen, eds., 1996) (finding that inequality is associated
with macroeconomic volatility in Latin America). See also G. Ramey & V.A. Ramey, Cross
Country Evidence on the Link Between Volatility and Growth, 85 AMER. ECON. REV. 1138, 1138
(1995) (finding that volatility in the rate of growth is associated with a lower average growth
rate).
85. Edward Glaeser, et al., supra note 76, at 28 ("This paper describes a possibly important
adverse effect of inequality on economic and social progress: the subversion of legal, regulatory,
and political institutions by the powerful .... [T]his risk indeed became a reality in the [United
States] during the Gilded Age and in Russia in the 1990s.").
86. See EASTERLY, supra note 8, at 267-78.
87. Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 1617.
88. Supra note 10.
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economic growth.8 9 Indeed, Humberto Lopez has specifically studied
which pro-growth strategies are most likely to unleash a virtuous cycle
of growth and poverty reduction. 90 "[Wie find that improvements in
education and infrastructure ... would lead to both growth and pro-
gressive distributional change." 91 Others have found that using a
quality-adjusted measure of human capital investment manifests not
only the key role human capital plays in achieving higher levels of
growth, but also the ability for such investments to reduce inequal-
ity.92 Other studies have pinpointed basic education as the crucial fac-
tor in dictating whether a community will participate in general
macroeconomic growth.93 Therefore, there is no doubt that invest-
ments in expanded educational opportunity for the economically
marginalized can enhance growth and diminish inequality.
The next section of this article will seek to define further which
measures are most likely to achieve these ends.
III. THE MACROECONOMIC GROWTH POTENTIAL OF REALIZING
THE PROMISE OF BROWN
All of this demonstrates that realizing the promise of Brown is
not costly; instead, enhancing educational opportunities for African-
American children is far more likely to support gains in
macroeconomic growth. Broad-based educational investments have
been identified as pro-growth policies that also serve to diminish ine-
quality. The United States seems poised to enjoy a virtuous cycle of
growth and diminished inequality, and endogenous growth theory
shows that these values do not conflict.
89. "Human capital has a crucial and positive role in long-run growth that goes beyond its
direct role as a factor of production. Education and human capital may also be considered a
complement to other production factors, determine the rate of technological innovation, and
facilitate technological absorption." Lopez, supra note 80, at 9.
90. Id. at 20.
91. Id.
92. Gundlach, et al., Education is Good for the Poor: A Note on Dollar & Kraay, in Shor-
rocks, supra note 5, at 101 ("Hence, taken together, our findings suggest that in addition to its
growth effect, improving the stock of human capital may have a substantial distributional effect
on the average income of the poor."). This study responds to empirical findings that although
primary educational enrollment and attainment were associated with higher growth, these fac-
tors had little distributional effect beyond the growth generated. Id. at 101-02. Both of these
studies concur that enhanced human capital development leads to higher growth as Dollar and
Kraay specifically find that secondary education is "positively and significantly associated with
growth." David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth is Good for the Poor, in Shorrocks, supra note 5,
at 48. These findings are also easily reconciled with the realization that skilled human capital is
the input most likely to support growth and jobs in a globalized market, rather than mere pri-
mary education. See supra note 10. Finally, for purposes of this paper, any conflict between
these studies is unimportant; neither suggests that enhancing educational opportunity as a means
of reducing racial inequality would harm the economy or would imply any sort of trade-off with
efficiency or some other economic value.
93. Martin Ravallion & Gaurev Datt, Why Has Economic Growth Been More Pro Poor in
Some States in India than Others?, 68 J. DEVELOP. ECON. 381, 396 (2002) (finding that human
capital development accounted for differences among states in economic outcomes in India).
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Nevertheless, it is not as easy as just spending money.
"[H]ighlighting the importance of education policy.., should be ac-
companied by a more precise identification of effective education pol-
icies that would actually generate the expected effects. '94 Empirical
evidence now shows that the institutional structure of the education
system can be as important as resources. 95 Specifically, the following
factors are associated with school performance even more than fund-
ing: central control over examinations and curricular and budgetary
affairs; school autonomy in process and personnel decisions; competi-
tion from private educational institutions; individual teachers having
both incentives and power to select teaching methods; limited union
influence; scrutiny of students' outputs; and encouragement of paren-
tal involvement. 96 Thus, endogenous growth theory teaches the ele-
ments of a more effective means of structuring educational
institutions.
Professor Robinson calls for neighborhood schools that are ade-
quately funded and have a diverse learning environment. 97 At the
same time she laments the realities that continue to plague that vision:
the problems inherent in using the property tax system as the primary
means of funding education; the problems of re-segregation of schools
and re-segregation within schools that are ostensibly integrated; the
United States Supreme Court's post-Brown retrenchment; and the
erosion of urban tax bases.98 Professor Robinson's vision is economi-
cally sound. She adds elements that are of certain value, such as a
diverse learning environment, even though these elements have not
yet been economically tested.99 Her vision includes elements that are
associated in the endogenous growth theory literature with successful
educational (and therefore economic) outcomes. 100 Nevertheless,
many such elements are beyond the scope of her paper. For example,
her article does not address the role of unions. Moreover, Professor
Robinson tacitly admits that many of the problems she articulates
defy easy solution and may be intractable.10 Thus, in the end, endog-
94. Erich Gundlach et al., Education is Good for the Poor: A Note on Dollar and Kraay, in
Shorrocks, supra note 5, at 102.
95. Id. at 102 (citing Ludgar Woessmann, Why Students in Some Countries do Better: Inter-
national Evidence on the Importance of Education Policy, 1 EDUC. MATTERS 67 (2001); Erich
Gundlach & Ludgar Woessmann, The Fading Productivity of Schooling in East Asia. 12 J. ASIAN
ECON. 401 (2001); and Erich Gundlach, Ludgar Woessmann & Jens Gmelin, The Decline of
Schooling Productivity in OECD Countries, 111 ECON. J. 135 (2001)).
96. Id.
97. Robinson, supra note 11, at 28.
98. Id. at 10-24.
99. Ramirez III, supra note 70, at 54-55 (summarizing empirical data and constructing theo-
retical model regarding the benefits and power of well-managed diversity in education).
100. Supra notes 94-96.
101. Robinson, supra note 11, at 27.
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enous growth theory merely suggests that her vision would spur
growth.
This is the essential limitation of the endogenous growth theory.
As a positive approach to economics it can explain much. Still, with a
fundamental value of skepticism with respect to theoretical conjec-
ture, the theory's youthful lack of specificity is crippling as a norma-
tive tool. 0 2 At times, it can provide useful insights into past successes
and failures. 10 3 Rarely will its empirically based literature give defini-
tive policy prescriptions. 10 4 Indeed, because endogenous growth the-
ory relies heavily upon empirical studies of macroeconomic
performance across nations, one may justifiably be skeptical of its les-
sons on a very fundamental basis: just because a certain policy ap-
proach is associated with desired economic outcomes in certain
nations does not necessarily mean the same policy will yield identical
results in another nation with a different social and cultural context.'0 5
Aside from providing general guidance about the likely effectiveness
of general policies, however, endogenous growth theory certainly pro-
vides a foundation for further analysis. It can be supplemented with
interdisciplinary studies bearing upon the same issue.'0 6 In addition,
history can illustrate how the lessons from endogenous growth theory
may be implemented most propitiously in a given society.107
For example, in the United States, one of the most successful edu-
cational investment programs has been the GI Bill. 108 The GI Bill
provided $14 billion in educational benefits to 7.8 million returning
veterans after World War 11.109 In a cost-benefit analysis of these ex-
penditures, Congress found that for every dollar invested, the nation
received between $5 and $12.50 in benefits. t' 0 "These are extraordi-
narily high ratios of benefits to costs, far above the returns earned by
most other forms of investment, either government or private. Fur-
thermore, the additional taxes paid by these college-educated veterans
during their working lives more than paid for the cost of the pro-
gram." ' 1 Thus, funding the aspirations of veterans who chose to at-
102. Endogenous growth theory dates to the late 1980s. GORDON, supra note 4, at 330.
103. See supra notes 51-60.
104. Supra notes 92-94.
105. For example, human capital investments in African-Americans prior to the demolition
of "Jim Crow" laws would have been unlikely to spur growth to the same extent as afterwards.
See EASTERLY, supra note 8, at 276-77.
106. Supra note 95.
107. Ramirez II, supra note 4, at 555-59 (providing overview of United States government
sponsorship of human capital investments during the New Deal).
108. Id. at 557-59 (reviewing evidence of the success of the GI Bill). See also Staff Report,
Subcommittee on Education and Health, Joint Economic Committee, A Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Government Investment in Post-Secondary Education Under the World War II GI Bill, at 1
(Dec. 14, 1988) (unpublished report, on file with author) [hereinafter "Staff Report"].
109. Staff Report, supra note 108, at 1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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tend college, as a form of repayment for service to the nation, seems
to be a self-funding proposition that yields benefits long into the
future.1t2
A similar program for the development of human capital was the
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The point of the CCC was to
divert idle youth from the temptations of urban mischief to productive
works in service to the nation, often in national park or forest lands.' 13
In the process, these youths learned skills and responsibility. 114 Com-
mentators from the CCC era claimed that the benefits of the program
greatly exceeded the costs of the program, even though no rigorous
cost/benefit analysis is extant.115 The work done by the CCC was im-
portant work: billions of trees were planted; millions of acres of land
were protected from erosion and flooding; and hundreds of parks and
recreation areas were developed.116 In addition to forging men from
boys, the CCC also gave American youth the opportunity to become
acquainted with one another.11 7
There is similarly important work to be done today. In the third
year of the War on Terror, our borders are still largely unguarded and
key elements of our nation's infrastructure are not secure.' 18 Yet, the
African-American teen unemployment rate stands at 32.5%, while
whites and Hispanics suffer a teen unemployment rate of 15.7% and
19.7%, respectively.' 9 With so much need and so many idle youths, a
modern reincarnation of the CCC focused specifically on civil defense
against terror, seems reasonable. Service in this new civil defense
corps can be an explicit quid pro quo for educational benefits, much
like the GI Bill.1 20 Volunteers from the most deprived backgrounds
(but from all segments of America) could have the opportunity to at-
tend a new federally funded network of secondary schools in ex-
change for future commitments of national service.12' This network of
federally-endowed schools can be explicitly structured to mimic key
features associated with the success of the GI Bill and the CCC.
These educational benefits would therefore be earned by self-selected
112. The Staff Report based its calculations on a thirty-five-year period of accruing benefits.
Id. at 2.
113. Ramirez II, supra note 4, at 555-57.
114. Id. at 556.
115. JOHN A. SALMOND, THE CIVILIAN CONVERSATION CORPS, 1933-1942: A NEw DEAL
CASE STUDY 218 (1967).
116. Id. at 221.
117. See id.
118. See Rhonda Chriss Lokeman, Three Years After Sept. 11 Attack, U.S. is Still Vulnerable,
KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 12, 2004, at Bl (reviewing insecure elements of homeland defense).
119. Sue Kirchoff, Minorities Haven't Felt Economic Growth, USA TODAY, June 16, 2004, at
4B.
120. Supra note 108.
121. This structure closely tracks the structure of the CCC and the GI Bill. See supra notes
108 to 118.
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individuals, just as GI Bill educational benefits were distributed. 122
Our nation could be more secure and better educated. We could re-
duce inequality and enhance growth.
This alternative to Professor Robinson's vision has the advantage
of being written on a clean slate, unburdened by the history of secon-
dary education and the strong political bias against federal educa-
tion.123 Imagining a federal effort to funnel billions into secondary
education is easier than actually forging a political coalition to make it
happen.124 After all, it is the failure of political will to continue the
battle against racial oppression that is one of the most noteworthy
messages from Brown.125 As Professor Robinson catalogues, that his-
tory is one of massive resistance, massive judicial retrenchment, and a
massive political failure to pursue racial justice as well as a failure to
create a more powerful political economy for all Americans. 26
A failure to pursue enhanced equity and output means we toler-
ate and accept diminished equity despite its huge costs. Such is the
power of race in America in 2004.
IV. CONCLUSION
In general, Professor Robinson's call for vindication of the funda-
mental values of Brown is fully consistent with the new endogenous
growth theory and maximizing the output of the nation. There is no
trade-off between efficiency (or any other economic value) and eq-
uity, insofar as educating an oppressed minority is concerned. The
wanton and pervasive destruction of human capital implicit in race in
America is neither efficient nor consistent with maximum economic
growth, output, and stability. Brown is economically correct today;
the problem is the lack of political will to reduce racial inequality, not
the economic incentives for doing so.
122. Supra note 108.
123. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 8.
124. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 13.
125. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 29.
126. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 10-24.
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